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recommendations submitted to deal with corruption, black money and money laundering.
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S M Solaiman*

Abstract
Black money has been a chronic problem in Bangladesh for decades. Successive
governments have been offering amnesty to black money holders since 1976 by arguing that
the investment of that money in local markets will boost the country’s national economy, and
the money will be laundered overseas in the absence of such a privilege. To the contrary,
empirical evidence suggests that such recurrent amnesties have not benefited the economy,
rather have increased corruption and money laundering. Nonetheless, the Anti-Corruption
Commission (ACC) itself has formally suggested the government to give one more chance to
BMHs to whiten their black money ‘through purchasing land and apartments to discourage
corruption’. This article finds that the ACC’s recommendation is flawed, ill-thought-out and
misjudgement of the futility of the amnesties offered to date. It submits specific suggestions
to deal with black money in order to reduce corruption and money laundering, and concludes
that the watchdog must bark in order to keep predators away.

Purpose: The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the recurrent amnesties to black
money holders in Bangladesh have not benefited the national economy, rather have increased
corruption and money laundering, and that offering further opportunity to whiten back money
as recommended by the Anti-Corruption Commission of Bangladesh (ACC) will do more
harm than good.
Design/methodology: The research carried out in this article relies on both primary and
secondary materials adopting an archival analysis of the existing literature.
Findings: The major findings include: the recurrent amnesties to black money holders have
damaging impacts on corruption and money laundering in Bangladesh; the ACC’s
recommendation to provide further opportunity to legalise black money is flawed, ill-thoughtout and misjudgement of the futility of the amnesties offered to date; and the black money
problem could be better addressed through employing educational, preventive and punitive
measures that have been specifically formulated in this article.
Research limitation/implications: This research does not examine the flaws that may remain
in the provisions of existing laws, rather it gives emphasis to the enforcement of the law in
place. Legal flaws thus can be a subject–matter of another endeavour.
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Practical implications: As implications, it is expected that this research will encourage the
concerned authorities in Bangladesh to stop offering amnesties to black money holders for
good. Also, other countries facing a similar problem can learn from the experience of
Bangladesh presented, and specific recommendations submitted, in this article, in dealing
with black money, corruption and money laundering.
Social implications: It is expected that if the recommendations furnished in this article are
implemented corruption in, and money laundering from, Bangladesh will reduce. This
reduction will facilitate ensuring fairness in the society in many respects, deter criminal
activities associated with black money, and enable honest taxpayers to buy their homes in a
level-playing filed.
Originality/value: This article presents original research in terms of analysis of materials and
the recommendations submitted to deal with corruption, black money and money laundering.

Keywords: Black money, Corruption, Money laundering, Bangladesh

Introduction
Black money, generally proceeds of corruption and other illegal activities, has been a chronic
problem in Bangladesh for decades. Money is usually cleaned and sanitised,1 but the way of
earning or receiving it makes it black or white. Black money is defined by the Bangladesh
National Board of Revenue (NBR) as being the money earned legally or illegally, but not
declared to the government agencies, thus its holders avoid paying tax.2 This is an incomplete
definition focused on taxation only, and it largely ignores the concept of inherent illegality in
holding black money which is typically ‘amassed through immoral, improper and illegitimate
means.’3 Black money is more aptly defined, linking with corruption and other illegal
activities, as the ‘money illegally obtained through political and/or bureaucratic corruption,
bribery at all levels of the government, semi-government, autonomous or semi-autonomous
offices or organisations, as well as money amassed by businesspeople through smuggling,
black marketing, shady deals, profiteering, money amassed by labour leaders, student leaders,
through extortion – and especially, money amassed by functionaries of the ruling government
party and its various organs, and their families, relatives and cronies.’4 Corruption is one of
the ways of ‘grabbing’ black money which is laundered to hide its origins. Thus black
money, corruption and money laundering are interrelated.
*Dr S M Solaiman, School of Law, University of Wollongong, Australia, and Honorary Consultant, Hoque &
Associate (a leading law firm), Bangladesh. Email: sheikh@uow.edu.au
1
David Chaikin, ‘Commercial Corruption and Money Laundering: A Preliminary Analysis’, (2008) 15(3)
Journal of Financial Crime 269, 273.
2
Attiya Waris and Laila Abdul Latif, Policy Brief, Black Money Whitening Law: A Study from Bangladesh, 12,
Norwegian
Institute
of
International
Affairs
(Sept.
2013),
1-3.
https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/191558/NUPI%20Policy%20Brief-9-13-WarifLatif.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y (12 May 2017).
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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Successive governments of Bangladesh have been allowing black money holders (BMHs) to
whiten their ‘ill-gotten’ money in different ways, such as investing in securities and real
estate markets, claiming that the whitening opportunity will help boost the national economy.
However, no credible evidence is available to support that the avowed objective of boosting
national economy by granting amnesty to such wrongdoers has been ever achieved.
Contrarily, research demonstrates otherwise that such opportunities to invest black money in
securities and real estate markets have witnessed no positive impacts on the markets.5
Instead, the opportunities have furthered corruption and facilitated money laundering making
the country world champion in corruption for consecutively 5 years (2001-05) in the yearly
corruption perception index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI), a German-based anticorruption organisation.6 Taking advantage of such persistent amnesties, corruption gradually
permeates all level of society in the country. The situation is so intractable that the Chief
Justice of Bangladesh publicly pronounces that ‘if Tk 100 is allocated for any development
purpose in the country, Tk 40 is spent and Tk 60 is stolen.’7
All opposition political parties have always opposed such legalisation of illegal money, and
sometimes even finance ministers have openly admitted the unfairness in granting such
amnesties. Nonetheless the successive governments had succumbed to invisible pressures at
the time of drafting annual national budgets for decades. The debate about black money is
revived every year when members of civil societies, leading economists, and various
organisations, such as Transparency International-Bangladesh (TIB),8 sternly oppose this
indemnity. This disapproval is voiced against the unjustified demand of vested quarters
organised under the banner of real estate business9 and stock brokers during the pre-budget
parley that this opportunity be given to BMHs. The case is somewhat different this year in
that the Anti-Corruption Commission of Bangladesh (ACC) itself has formally suggested the
government to give one more chance to BMHs to whiten their black money ‘through
purchasing land and apartments to discourage corruption’.10 By contrast, previously the ACC
along with the National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh intensely opposed such a
discriminatory treatment of BMHs by arguing that it contravenes the national constitution,
international obligations as well the laws governing anti-money laundering and corruption as
discussed shortly below.

5

See S M Solaiman, ‘Black Money, ‘White’ Owners, and Blue Tenants in the Bangladesh Housing Market:
Where Corruption Makes the Difference as Protectors Turn Predators’ (2016) 23(2) Journal of Financial Crime
501; S M Solaiman, ‘Laws Whitening Black Money for Boosting National Economy:
Prevention or
Legalisation of Corruption in Bangladesh?’ (2014) 17(2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 141.
6

Staff Correspondent, ‘TI Brands Bangladesh Most Corrupt for Fifth Time’ Daily Star, Dhaka (19 Oct 2005),
Front page.
7
Staff Reporter, ‘Tk 60 Out of Every Tk 100 Stolen in Dev Project: CJ’ Daily Star, Dhaka (19 May 2017), City.
8
FE Reporter, ‘TIB against Allowing Undisclosed Money in Next Budget’ Financial Express, Dhaka (5 Apr
2017), Finance.
9
FE Report, ‘“Undisclosed” Money Investment to Help Check Capital Flight: REHAB’ Financial Express,
Dhaka (13 May 2017), Trade & Market; FE Report, ‘Realtors Seek Free Investment of Undisclosed Money’
Financial Express, Dhaka (4 Apr 2017), Economy.
10
Jasim Uddin, ‘Give Money Legalising Scope Once and for All - ACC Suggests Govt’ New Age, Dhaka (5 Feb
2017), Business.
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It is to be borne in mind that once corruption is tolerated in one area, the evil is likely to
spread out all other areas of regulation in our society. 11 Thus the ACC’s unusual solicitation
in favour of ‘predators’ provides impetus for this article. However, despite such disputed
advocacy by the ACC, it is commendable that its current chairman has already demonstrated
greater activism than his predecessors in combating corruption, and this has generated public
confidence to some extent that corrupt practices and resultant money laundering will
gradually reduce, if the proactive moves continue to operate. Positive effects of the ACC’s
proactivity is evident in the fact that people have already started leaving luxury cars on the
street concealing ownership details fearing prosecution for evading tax and hiding source of
income.12 Despite the ACC’s recommendation, the Finance Minister initially states, perhaps
being instigated by his past experience of futility, that the government does not want to
further offer the whitening opportunity, rather is trying to find out ways of exterminating this
privilege.13 But a later report referring to NBR officials discloses that the opportunity will
survive over again this year.14 In such a situation, the ACC’s recommendation and the
anticipated budget provision for further mercy towards BMHs warrant a revisit to the past
opportunities, public responses thereto, and resultant effects on corruption and money
laundering. This article is devoted to that pursuit.

History and illegality of amnesties to black money holders in Bangladesh
The amnesty to BMHs was first introduced in 1976, and the privilege had continued to exist
ever since one way or another although no tangible benefits have been evident over this
prolonged period of time.15 Rather, perhaps more appallingly, the long disputed opportunity
has been proved to be not only immoral, unfair, discriminatory, but also illegal and
unconstitutional in Bangladesh.16 Article 27 of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides a
fundamental right that all citizens to be treated equally as it reads ‘[a]ll citizens are equal
before law and are entitled to equal protection of law.’ The Constitution, as stated in its Art
7(2), is the supreme law of the land, and any law inconsistent with it shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void. Arguing that the amnesty is contrary to the purpose of establishing the
ACC, Justice Sultan pronounced, while he was chairman of the ACC, that ‘[i]t goes against
the spirit of the constitution of Anti-Corruption Commission. This is self-contradictory,17 and
it contravenes s26 of the Anti-Corruption Act 2004 (Bangladesh) which enables the ACC to
ask anyone to submit necessary statements of one’s assets, if it thinks necessary. The amnesty
undermines the national and international obligations of the state to prevent corruption and
money laundering.18 Bangladesh ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption
11

Susan Rose-Ackerman as cited in Edward L Rubin, ‘Corruption, Governance, and Morality’ (2014) 92 Texas
Law Review 943, 963.
12
Star Online Report, ‘Mercedes with Fake Number Plate Seized in Dhaka’ Daily Star, Dhaka (2 May 2017),
City; UNB, ‘Posh Car Seized from Hatirjheel’ The Independent, Dhaka (11 Apr 2017), Metro.
13
Staff Reporter, ‘Budget Will Contain the Ways of Finding Out the Sources of Black Money: Finance
Minister’ Bonik Barta, Dhaka (20 March 17), News (translated from Bengali).
14
Jasim Uddin, ‘Looking Back: Budget FY2016-17 - Legalisation of Undisclosed Money Loses Efficacy’ New
Age, Dhaka (29 May 2017), Bangladesh.
15
Solaiman (2014), above n 5, 145.
16
Solaiman (2016) above n 5; Solaiman (2014) above n 5.
17
Shamim Ahsan, ‘Cover Story- A Budget without Direction’ Daily Star, Dhaka (24 Jun 2005), Star Magazine.
18
Solaiman (2014) above n 5, 150.

Page 4 of 28

2003 (UNCAC) on 27 February 2007 assuming responsibility to prevent corruption as the
instrument purports to ‘[t]o promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat
corruption more efficiently and effectively’19 and obligates member states to undertake
preventive measures against corruption.20 Particularly, it violates international obligations
under Art 5 (preventive anti-corruption policies and practices) and Arts 15-25
(criminalisation and law enforcement) of the UNCAC. Further, the opportunity inherently
flouts anti-money laundering legislation of the country, as the offering of amnesty itself
facilitates money laundering as the offence is defined in s2(v) of the Money Laundering
Prevention Act 2012 (Bangladesh). The indemnity assists BMHs in legalising their illegally
accumulated money, and in laundering that money taking advantage of such leniency. The
whitening opportunity directly contradicts tax evasion proscriptions contained in ss165 and
166 of the Income Tax Ordinance 1984 (Bangladesh), which prescribe that making false
statements and concealment of income are criminal offence punishable by imprisonment
which may extend to three to five years and fines. Besides, corruption also contravenes
human rights, therefore, any act directly or indirectly facilitating corruption infringes on such
rights, 21 as further discussed shortly below.
The history, illegality and investment impacts of this indemnity have been previously
discussed elsewhere in a greater detail.22 Based on the above references to different laws, we
can briefly conclude that the amnesty at issue is blatantly illegal and unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, against all these constitutional and legal prohibitions, s19BBBBB of the Income
Tax Ordinance 1984 (Bangladesh) provides that people can invest their ‘undisclosed’
income, without facing any question from the taxmen, in residential real estate. This income
tax provision constitutes the aforesaid violations of laws impacting heavily on the
insemination of corruption, black money and money laundering in Bangladesh.23 People from
all walks of life, other than the BMHs and certain unscrupulous businesspersons, are opposed
to this opportunity, whilst the ACC’s support for further opportunity undermines the
opposition this year.

Critiques of the amnesty to black money holders
Corruption comes into play in discussing black money as the latter is generally proceeds of
the former, thus to some extent, these two evils are synonymous. Besides, corruption and
black money mingle in the commission of several crimes including, money laundering,
homicides and terrorism. Hence, a definition of corruption is warranted in criticising black
money.
19

United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003, Art 1(a). See also its Art 5 which imposes obligations
for preventing measures directly.
20
See United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003, Art 5.
21
Joel M Ngugi, ‘Making the Link Between Corruption and Human Rights: Promises and Perils (2010) 104
American Society of International Law Proceedings 246; Julio Bacio-Terracinot, ‘Linking Corruption and
Human Rights’ (2010) 104 American Society of International Law Proceedings 243.
22
Solaiman (2014) above n 5.
23
For further details, Solaiman (2014) above n 5; Solaiman (2016) above n 5.
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There is no single definition of corruption as it depends on the law of a given jurisdiction.
However, it is generally defined as ‘receiving any money from one’s exercise of office from
any source other than one’s official employer or as hiring anyone for an administrative
position on any basis other than the meritocratic criteria established for the position.’ 24
Corruption is usually described as the abuse of power for private gains, 25 or in other words, it
‘is the use or misuse of public office for private gain.’26 Art 15 of the UNCAC defines the
term by referring to numerous acts constituting corruption, such as bribery, embezzlement
and misappropriation, conversion, obstruction of justice, trading in influence, abuse of
functions and illicit enrichment.
Underkuffler terms corruption as ‘the essence of evil, and to be corrupt is to succumb to the
temptations of evil.’ 27 Kofi Annan, former UG Secretary General, describes corruption as
‘an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies’ and further adds
that it ‘undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights,
distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organised crime, terrorism and other
threats to human security to flourish.’28
Any definition regardless, corruption is a crime in all legal systems, nonetheless it exists in
almost all countries in varying degrees. Corruption, as a breeding ground of black money, has
become cancerous in Bangladesh,29 while it has turned into a global problem affecting many
aspects of humankind, such as international business, human rights, justice administration,
health care, economic development and so on.30
The evil of corrupt practices cause sufferings to all in a society in various ways, such as the
deprivation of justice, undue harassments, starvation, frustration, loss of productivity and so
on, whereas corrupt persons enjoy its benefits owing to impunity being granted by the state.
Referring to corruption, Sandage asserts that it damages economic growth, diminish
completion and causes significant legal and reputational risks to a country.31 Pope goes on to
say that the evil of corruption ‘crushes’ the market forces playing in a free market economy,
in support he adds that the ‘honest business person goes broke, the rules of a healthy
economic system become twisted, and companies addicted to paying bribes become
rotten….’ 32 It interferes with the standard ways of defining offences and affects controlling
public servants, particularly when clemency is shown to corrupt practices and proceeds
thereof.
24

As cited in Rubin (2014) above n 11, 957.
See John Sandage, ‘Keynote Speech: Global Corruption and the Universal Approach of the United Nations
Convention against Corruption’ (2015) 53 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 7, 9.
26
J Edgardo Campos & Sanjay Pradhan (eds), The Many Faces of Corruption, The World Bank (2007), 9.
27
As cited in Rubin (2014) above n 11, 943.
28
United Nations Convention against Corruption 2003, Foreword (Kofi A. Annan).
29
UNB, ‘Dr Kamal Urges All to Raise Voice against Corruption’ Financial Express, Dhaka (13 May 2017),
National.
30
Beka Feathers, ‘Symposium: Bribes Without Borders: The Challenge Of Fighting Corruption In The Global
Context’ (2014) 29 American University International Law Review 287, 287.
31
Sandage (2015), above n 25, 13.
32
Jeremy Pope, Corruption in Africa: The Role for Transparency International (TI) (1994) 20 Commonwealth
Law Bulletin 1468, 1470.
25
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Corruption in most cases is a white collar crime, which causes significant social harm, other
than physical injuries.33 Showing soft approach to white-collar criminals, while imposing
harsh punishment to meagre thieves, represents inequality in justice, which is embedded in
the sentencing and enforcement system in Bangladesh.34 For example, a shoplifter may be
instantly killed by the agitated crowd without trial (it happens in Bangladesh!) or be awarded
up to three years imprisonment, whereas bribe-receivers and money launderers are treated in
the society with unduly great respect mainly because of their money. It demonstrates implicit
public tolerance for white-collar crimes, and intolerance for trivial criminals. A sense of
inequality and injustice is thus entrenched in this approach, and it goes against the
constitutional guarantee of equality before law, a cornerstone of the administration of justice
and the rule of law. A criminal should be treated as criminal. Stuntz asserts that ‘[u]nequal
justice is an oxymoron; law makes justice both equal and just’. 35 Any leniency towards
corruption will: only multiply this evil; amply other crimes; magnify public miseries; stagnate
national economy; hinder justice delivery; and widen the gap between the haves and havenots.

Impacts of corruption in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has probably had enough in both offering impunity to, and suffering pains from,
corruption. Some of its experiences can be summarised as follows:
Increasing corruption
A nationwide household survey conducted in 201536 by TIB released in June 2016 reveals a
significant increase in corruption in Bangladesh. The 2015 survey records an amount of
Tk88.22 billion (US$1102.75m.) paid in bribe in financial year 2014-2015, whilst the amount
was Tk73.25 billion (US$915.63m) in 2012. So the total amount paid as bribe was Tk14.97
billion (US$187.13m) higher in 2015 than that was found in the previous survey conducted in
2012. 37 The amount paid during 2014-2015 period is equivalent to 0.6 per cent of the
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 3.7 per cent of its revised national budget for
2014-15. 38 It identifies that 67.8 per cent of the surveyed households became victims of
corruption when they sought services in 16 sectors including law enforcement agencies, the
judiciary, public health and banking. 39
Paradoxically, many officials of the ACC itself are reportedly involved in corruption, and
several officials were punished for their previous offences, and some of the punished officials

33

Anonymous, ‘Go Directly to Jail: White Collar Sentencing after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’ (2009) 122 Harvard
Law Review 1728, 1743-44.
34
For an analysis of the concept and application of ‘unequal justice’, see William J Stuntz, ‘Unequal Justice’
(2008) 121 Harvard Law Review 1969.
35
Id, 2040.
36
Corruption in Service Sector: National Households Survey 2015.
37
FE Report, ‘Graft in Services Sector on the Rise’, Financial Express, Dhaka (30 Jun 2016), Economy.
38
Ibid.
39
See for details, ibid.
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committed the wrongs again. 40 It is not surprising, because the ACC people are recruited
from the same society where corruption is widespread. The ACC took departmental punitive
actions against 28 of its officials for committing irregularities including receiving bribes
between 2004 and 2014. 41 Alarmingly enough, since the assumption of the office the present
ACC chairman, the watchdog has reportedly served show cause notices on at least 800 of its
own employees for committing various irregularities as in September 2016. 42 Some of the
ACC officers are currently facing criminal charges. 43 In such a circumstance, a question
begs to be answered – who will watch the watchers? However, we can conclude, all this
reiterates that corruption breeds corruption.
The following figure containing CPI of Transparency International displays that Bangladesh
has recently made some progress in international comparison, but corruption is still at an
alarming level.
Figure 1: Bangladesh CPI Scores 2001-201544

The 2015 CPI report identifies the most likely causes of corruption in Bangladesh are
misgovernance, manipulation, and corruption in the public sector.45 Although these three may
apparently look different, they are factually rooted in ‘corruption’.
Stimulating money laundering
Empirical evidence on the disputed amnesties suggests that whitening opportunity does entice
and facilitate money laundering.46 The increasing trend in capital flights from Bangladesh is
40

Ahammad Foyez, ‘Graft, Irregularities: ACC Finds 13 of Its Staff Involved’, New Age, Dhaka (26 Sep 16),
Front page.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
The figure is adopted from: Muhammad Zamir, ‘Re-visiting Corruption in Bangladesh’, Financial Express,
Dhaka (25 Jul 2016), Op-Ed.
45
Ibid.
46
See Waris & Latif (2013), above n 2.
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discussed in the following section in demonstrating link between corruption and money
laundering. However money launderers are not being punished, as can be seen in the
following table on money laundering complaints and convictions statistics.
Table 1: Money laundering: complaints and investigations47
Year Complaints Dismissed First
Amounts of
Information Money
Report
(Taka
in
Received
Crore)
US$1=Tk80
2009 1
2
652.3
2010 56
3
19
71.6
2011 67
6
35
156.7
2012 80
11
132
89.6
2013 81
9
66
9019.9
2014 89
20
20
736.6
2015 26
(Jan- 27
11
72.6
June)
Total 400
76
284
10799.3

Final
Reports

Charge
Convicts
Sheeted
Accused

2
3
11
10
13
4

2
4
6
64
36
50
52

1
2
1

43

214

4

Table 1 shows that only 4 persons have been convicted over a period of 7 years against 400
complaints being lodged during the same period. It clearly indicates investigation and
prosecutorial weaknesses, which need to be addressed immediately.
Further evidence of increasing trend in money laundering from Bangladesh is presented
shortly below in showing relation between corruption and money laundering.
Growing banking crimes
All of the state-owned banks, major commercial banks in the country, have been suffering
from capital crisis for several years.48 Corrupt practices by bank officials and mala fide
borrowers have created this crisis. A recent research conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of
Bank Management (BIBM) finds that banks officers themselves are involved in 90%
banking crimes (cheque forgery, irregularities in approving loans, unauthorised money
transfers , opening false accounts, credit/debit cards frauds etc). 49 The research carried out
by a director of BIBM, who conducted a survey amongst officers and customers of different
banks based on crime related information between 2014 and 2016.50 It digs out that even
depositors’ savings are not safe because 65 per cent of the committed crimes affect bank
savings.51

47

Sumon Afsar & Jesmin Moli, Bangladesh’s Success in Preventing Money Laundering Negligible’ Bonik
Barta, Dhaka (22 Dec 2016), First page (translated from Bengali).
48
Fakhrul Islam & Sanaullah Sakib, ‘Tax Money Going to State Owned Banks’ Prothom Alo, Dhaka (30 May
2017), Economic (translated from Bengali).
49
Hassan Adnan, ‘Officers Involved in 90% Banking Crimes’ Bonik Barta, Dhaka (4 Nov 2016), Last page
(translated from Bengali).
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
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Alongside bank officials, mala fide borrowers are yet another factor of these banking
irregularities. The rising trend in loan defaults awful as can be seen in the Table below.
Table 2: Default loans 2007-201652

There is no sign of easing this crisis, rather as on May 2017, defaulted loans in state-run
banks have further increased to Tk 41,399.70cr (US$51749.63m),53 while it was Tk63,335 cr
(US$89168.75m) in 2016.
Shockingly enough, Bangladesh is champion amongst Asia-Pacific countries in respect of the
rate of default loans as depicted below.
Figure 2: Rates of default loans in Asia-Pacific countries (referred to IMF)54

Rates of Default Loans
10.00%
9.00%
8.00%
7.00%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%

8.79%
5.90%

2.40% 2.70%

1.90% 1.60% 1.60% 1.50%

1%

0.90% 0.70% 0.60%

A central bank investigation into such loans unearthed that the ‘banks disbursed huge amount
of loans in recent years on political consideration, violating rules and regulations’.55 The
52

Table 2 is adopted from: Rejaul Karim Byron & Md Fazlur Rahman, ‘Default Loans Soar’, Daily Star, Dhaka
(26 Aug 2016), Front page.
53
Staff Correspondent, ‘Defaulted Loans in State-Run Banks Tk 41,399.70cr’ Financial Express, Dhaka (26
May 2017), Business.
54
Special Correspondent, ‘Highest Defaulted Loans in Bangladesh’ Prothom Alo, Dhaka (14 May 2016),
Economics (translated from Bengali).
55
AKM Zamir Uddin, ‘Bad Loans Jump to Tk 54,173cr in 9 Months’ New Age, Dhaka (3 Dec 2016), Business.
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default loans make up 94 per cent of the capital of 38 banks,56 while cumulative written-off
bank loans now stood Tk4140.37 billion (US$51754.63m) indicating clearly that they failed
to exercise due care and diligence in sanctioning credits.57 Experts blame on corruption for
such a situation. For example, Salehuddin Ahmed, a former Bangladesh Bank Governor, says
that ‘the problem was created because the loans were given through anomalies and corrupt
practices. Furthermore, the loans were never monitored, and actions were not taken to realise
them even when the banks came to know that they had become default.’58 He adds that undue
political influence affects these loans in two ways: banks are dictated to approve such loans,
and the lenders are subsequently prevented from taking legal actions against the defaults.59
Thus the borrowers feel safe in borrowing savers’ money (including small savers) knowing
that they will never be compelled to return the borrowed money. As a result, a total of 75 per
cent young people of the country believe that politicians are misusing their powers, and they
demand that punishments for corruption be exemplary.60
Generating pessimism
A total of 47.66 million out of its 160 million people are youth in Bangladesh.61 They are the
future leaders and will be the driving force of the country. Their positive attitude towards the
affairs and future of the country is essential. But they are losing confidence in dreaming for a
better future as revealed in a recent survey. This pessimism sounds even more worrying than
other effects of corruption. A total of 76 per cent young people in Bangladesh have been
pessimists caused by widespread corruption and misuse of powers with impunity, 62 while the
present Finance Minister admits the government’s failure to effectively combat corruption. 63
Even the current ACC chair is deemed to be pessimist while he finds ‘pervasive corruption’
in government offices, and an influential editorial writes commenting on his views that ‘he,
however, appeared to be at loss in the situation as he said that he did not know how to reduce
corruption’.64 This comment is fortified while the ACC chair himself pronounces that
‘corruption has reached such a place that he has no idea how to reduce it.’65 While the
editorial recognises the ACC chair’s genuine concerns, it accuses the ACC by saying, ‘the
fact remains that the commission has not done enough to punish the powerful nexus
composed of corrupt government officials, unscrupulous businessmen and the politically
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powerful quarters that breeds corruption from centre to the periphery.’66 Hence the failure to
prevent corruption has multiplied the ill-practices generating pessimism amongst the
generation, which may have long term negative impacts on the future leadership and
workforce in the country.
Controlling legislature
Law makers are generally expected to have adequate knowledge of law and legislative
process To the contrary, the national parliament of the country is being gradually dominated
by moneyed people as evident in a recent study. The following Figure shows the dominance
of business people instead of lawyers in the parliament.
Figure 3: Lawyers and business people in the parliament (1954-2014) 67
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The numbers of MPs from these two different groups provides evidence of the usage of
excessive money in elections, because business people are gradually outperforming lawyers.
The dominance of lawyers in legislatures all over the world is quite logical. The Bangladesh
parliament had lawyers’ majority before, however, that is not the case any longer.
Lawmakers are now mostly businessmen. They spend a lot of money to buy the nomination.
A former law minister who is a lawyer by profession said that lawyers cannot compete with
businesspersons in terms of money. The domination of businessmen has reportedly impacted
on weakening the quality of legislation and behaviour of legislators.68 Following the
declaration of invalidity and unconstitutionality of certain pieces of legislation and
constitutional amendments by the highest court of the country, the Chief Justice of
Bangladesh identifies lawmakers’ ignorance of law and urged them to make law properly.69
Interestingly, there is a correlation between holding elections and laundering money, because
a higher amount is plundered during the year of election. For example, the latest national
election was held in January 2014, and 2013 witnessed a significant amount of money
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laundering.70 It is widely believed that black money acts as a game changer in elections with
respect to securing party nominations and ‘buying’ votes. It is well known that a major source
of corruption and money laundering is fraudulent invoicing (under and over invoicing) in
international business.
Violating human rights
Corruption does affect many aspects of our lives including human rights.71 Government
officials who use their official positions for private gains and receive bribes they violate,
among others, human rights.
Corruption has both direct and indirect connections with human rights violations, it is thus
inversely related to human rights. 72 Although the impacts of corruption vary between
individual cases, it is acknowledged that all human rights can be affected by corrupt
practices. 73 For example, corruption directly violates human rights when a bribe is offered to
a judge to unfairly influence the judge that may deprive the contesting party of the right to
fair trial. 74 There is a serious allegation of judicial corruption in Bangladesh. A 2016 survey
conducted by TIB reveals that 48.2 per cent people pay bribes to the judiciary.75 This massive
bribery is logically believed to have serious impacts on human rights of the competing
litigants. Another example of direct violation could be adulteration of foods through corrupt
practices, 76 which are rampant in Bangladesh, and it infringes on the right to life.77
In some instances, corruption may not directly violate human rights, but it fuels such
violations. 78 In those cases, corruption plays an indirect role in violating human rights when
it creates an environment leading to such violations. For example, business people pay bribes
to public officials in many countries in order to obtain their consent to important illegal
importation of toxic materials from foreign countries. 79 Further, corruption may undermine
human rights in several ways, such as: (i) by weakening the capacity of government to
uphold, respect, protect and fulfil their national and international human rights obligations;
(ii) by reducing the amount of revenue collection resulting in corresponding reduction in
70
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funding public essential services, such as the right to health care; (iii) by stagnating economic
development causing poverty and related deprivation of several rights; and (iv) by preventing
fair administration of justice.80
Further, a weak regime for the protection of human rights could facilitate corruption,
conversely public policies aimed at promoting these rights are likely to prevent corruption. 81
For example, the proper exercise of the freedom of expression, assembly and association can
help disclose underhanded transactions, identify their causes and consequences, create
appropriate public policies and mobilise public opinion against such evil practices. 82
Similarly, the right to information can serve as a tool against corruption, promote
accountability, prevent impunity, improve governance quality. 83
The above examples clarify that corruption has an inimical relation with human rights,
therefore the former must be prevented in order to protect the latter – both cannot coexist at
least with respect to some of such rights.

Relation between corruption, black money and money laundering
Corruption generates excessive and unjustifiable profits or possession of black money to be
laundered in order to camouflage its illicit origins and add an appearance of legality.
Receiving money in a corrupt way itself is criminally prohibited, laundering is another
criminal act, and the laundered money is used for further illegal activities including militant
operations. So multiple-illegalities are entrenched in corruption in conjunction with
laundering. Corruption and money laundering are well connected, the former causes the
latter, and eats away public confidence in government and politics in a country.84 Corruption
generates surplus black money for the corrupt and thus stimulates money laundering. Money
laundering harms society,85 and it does emasculate the domestic and international financial
institutions and markets.86 Several commentators observe that the growing intellectual
awareness of operational practice between corruption, black money and money laundering
reinforces the proposition that these evils are interrelated.87 Chaikin asserts, linking
corruption and money laundering one underpins the other.88 He adds that further corruption
takes place when the individuals involved in siphoning off money is bribed for committing
80
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this laundering offence, and suggests that the effective public policy should be to combat
both of these ills simultaneously. 89
Money launders are not alone, they have both local and foreign collaborators. So laundering
is an organised crime. Judicial findings demonstrate that two main collaborators of money
launderers are financial institutions, predominantly banks, and professional intermediaries particularly lawyers. 90 In laundering money, the offenders remove the dirty money from its
sources, they move the illicit fund to a new source, the money is integrated into a legal
economy by whitening through currency conversion.91
There are three stages of money laundering: placement, layering, and integration; while
corruption is linked to every stage, one way or another.92 ‘Placement’ denotes the initial stage
in which the black money is deposited in a financial institution - thus it comes into the
financial system; ‘layering’ represents a complex task by which the money is separated from
the origins and invested in multiple vehicles located on different jurisdictions; and
‘integration’, refers to the final stage at which the original sources are camouflaged and
offenders get safe access to the laundered funds. 93 Khoyini et al describe money laundering
as a series of activities that are done by both natural and artificial persons in order to legalise
proceeds of crimes. 94 Whichever way we look at, we can find corruption and black money
are directly connected with money laundering.

Corruption and money laundering in Bangladesh
As a descriptive definition provided in s 2(v) of the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2012
(Bangladesh), ‘money laundering’ means:
(i) knowingly moving, converting, or transferring proceeds of crime or property involved in
an offence for the following purposes:(1) concealing or disguising the illicit nature, source, location, ownership or control of the
proceeds of crime; or
(2) assisting any person involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the
legal consequences of such offence;
(ii) smuggling money or property earned through legal or illegal means to a foreign country;
(iii) knowingly transferring or remitting the proceeds of crime to a foreign country or
remitting or bringing them into Bangladesh from a foreign country with the intention of
hiding or disguising its illegal source; or (iv) concluding or attempting to conclude financial
transactions in such a manner so as to reporting requirement under this Act may be avoided;
(v) converting or moving or transferring property with the intention to instigate or assist for
89
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committing a predicate offence; (vi) acquiring, possessing or using any property, knowing
that such property is the proceeds of a predicate offence; (vii) performing such activities so as
to the illegal source of the proceeds of crime may be concealed or disguised; (viii)
participating in, associating with, conspiring, attempting, abetting, instigate or counsel to
commit any offences mentioned above.

On the other hand, the word ‘corruption’ has been broadly defined in s2(e) of the AntiCorruption Act 2004 (Bangladesh) by reference to ‘the offences set out in the schedule to this
law’. The schedule identifies the designated offences by referring to sections 161, 162, 163,
164, 165, 165A, 165B, 166, 167, 168, 169, 217, 218, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477A of the
Penal Code 1860 (Bangladesh); all offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947
(Bangladesh); crimes related to corruption and bribery under the Money Laundering
Prevention Act 2012;95 and offences under ss109,120B and 511 of the Penal Code 1860 that
may relate to any of the offences stated above. Discussions of these offences at some length
fall beyond the scope of this article which is less concerned about potential shortcomings or
ambiguities in the definitions of the offences, because the lack of enforcement and recurrent
amnesties to BMHs overshadow those definitional flaws. In view of the above-stated
descriptions of corruption in Bangladeshi laws, it can be said that the offences under the
umbrella evil termed ‘corruption’ has been widely defined to incorporate all or at least most
forms of corrupt and unholy practices being used in Bangladesh.
Like corruption, money laundering has also been a chronic problem in Bangladesh, thus
taking preventive measures has been a national emergency. 96 Moneys are laundered in
different ways. Most of the laundered moneys come from international business. Although
those business people are engaged in legal trades, they are applying corrupt practices in their
payments. The statistics recently disclosed by the Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a
Washington-based research organisation, reveal that 87 per cent of illicit financial outflows
from Bangladesh from 2005 to 2014 came from fraudulent invoicing in international
business.97 The unscrupulous businesspersons employ this corrupt practice mainly in two
ways: under invoicing when importing goods and over invoicing when exporting goods. The
balance between the actual price and the invoiced price is kept overseas in a safe custody in
collaboration with their overseas counterparts – exporters and importers. According to the
GFI report, Bangladesh has suffered a loss between US$ 6.0 billion and US$ 9.0 billion to
illicit outflows in 2014 alone, whilst broadly the total loss of the country caused by such
outflows between 2005 and 2014 is reportedly US$75 billion. 98 As reported by GFI, US$5.88
billion is the average illicit financial outflow per year from Bangladesh during the past 10
years. 99 The shocking increasing trend in such financial flows as disclosed by GFI can be
witnessed in the figure below.
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Figure 4: Illicit financial outflows from Bangladesh 2005 - 2014100

Source: GFI
Correspondingly, the data provided by the central bank of Switzerland evidences that the
Bangladeshis’ deposits in Swiss banks are on the rise, and are increased by 10 per cent in
2015.101 Total funds held by Bangladeshis with the Swiss banks reached US$ 571 million in
2015.102 The following figure displays the current rising trend in such deposits by
Bangladeshis.
Figure 5: Bangladeshis money deposited in Swiss banks 2006 - 2015103
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Similarly, a depressing picture is found in the information on the investment of Bangladeshis
in the ‘Second Home Project’ in Malaysia. Over the past decade between 2004 and 2014, a
total of 2,850 Bangladeshis bought homes in Malaysia under this project, whilst their
numbers in 2016 and 2015 were respectively at least 189 and 215, according to the
information provided by the Government of Malaysia. 104 The total number of such
Bangladeshi home-buyers in Malaysia reached 3,399 at the end of November 2016, ranking
third largest home owners amongst foreigners. 105
The historic data of Bangladeshis’ home ownerships indicates that the Bangladeshis’ demand
to buy home in Malaysia is now stable, as portrayed below.
Figure 6: Bangladeshis homeowners in Malaysia 2003-2016106

Bangladeshis are buying properties in Malaysia and laundering money to overseas
destinations on the one hand, and the price of the residential apartments in their home country
is falling gradually owing to the lack of demand as projected in the following figure.
Figure 7: Falling apartment price in Dhaka107
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As of May 2015, Dhaka witnessed as many as 21,000 ready flats that remain unsold, because
the financial institutions stop giving housing loans to potential buyers. 108 Commentators
views that the stagnation will persist unless the interest rates on home loans are eased.109 This
may imply that BMHs are busy laundering money and buying properties overseas, while
white money earners are struggling to manage funds for apartments even though the market
force has cut the price. Despite this, there is no gainsaying the fact that the real estate market
is still dominated by BMHs, however, they do not wait for amnesty, rather they take it for
granted because of the continued indemnity from liability for amassing black money.
Owning a home to live in is everyone’s dream - financial ability regardless, and a stable
society necessitates such ownership. Nonetheless only 30 per cent people in Bangladesh own
their homes, whereas such ownership is up to 80 per cent in developed countries.110 These 30
per cent homeowners include Bangladeshis living aboard. 111 Despite such a situation,
Bangladeshis are busy buying homes overseas.
The aforesaid illicit outflows, deposits in Swiss banks and home-ownerships in Malaysia
graphically demonstrate that corruption generating black money and offences of money
laundering are on, and preventing this trend has become a challenge for the government. It is
however clear that repeated whitening opportunities with impunity have not incentivised
BMHs to stop sending money overseas, because while thousands of new flats are awaiting to
be sold in the capital city alone in Bangladesh, Bangladeshis are busy laundering their black
money. So, the recurrent immunities have only encouraged corruption and resultant money
laundering, rather than bringing any fruit to the national economy.

Things need to be done to combat corruption and money laundering
In view of the facts and discussions presented above, there is no denying the fact that both
corruption and money laundering are serious problems in Bangladesh. Weakening one of
these two vices is expected to correspondingly wane the other. It would be wrong or at least
a futile exercise to offer further opportunity to the lawbreakers by honouring the
recommendation submitted by the ACC, as the past and existing opportunities have not
brought any tangible benefits to the local economy.112 Measures needed to be taken against
these odds should be legally preventive, socially denouncing and constructively educational
for both supply and demand sides. Some specific measures are recommended below.
Strengthening enforcement of existing laws
This is not to admit that the existing laws are flawless. Rather this article gives emphasis to
enforcement of laws governing corruption, black money and money laundering. Strict
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enforcement showing the ‘ramifications of misconduct’ is often argued to be the ‘most
effective way’ of deterring white-collar crime,113 and is widely accepted that adequate
punishments work as effective deterrence in financial crimes. The culture of tax avoidance
has to be addressed strictly. A 2016 study reveals that there are around 6.90 million (4 per
cent of total population) people are eligible to pay tax in Bangladesh,114 whereas only 1.40
million people had Tax Identification Number (TIN) at the end of 2016, however,
encouragingly the number has increased to 2.85 million in 2017. 115 Some commentators find
that although people want to pay tax, they avoid doing it due to lack of conducive
environment caused by ‘unfavourable’ behaviour of tax officials. 116 One of the discouraging
factors for potential taxpayer is allegation against tax officials of being unfriendly and
corrupt. The recent significant increase in the number of TIN holders is attributable to
holding yearly tax fair by NBR during which hundreds of people spontaneously open their
TINs every year. This fair has been enjoying rising popularity since its beginning in 2010.117
It means that honest and friendly behaviour of tax officials can make a difference. However,
it must be borne in mind that ‘carrot’ will not work in most cases, so ‘stick’ is essential to
prevent breaches of law.
Effective enforcement of laws governing tax, corruption and money laundering entails well
trained investigators, strong prosecution teams and efficient benches in the judiciary. Lack of
these requirements exists in Bangladesh.
Enforcement must be meaningful demonstrating the force of deterrence. Experts opine that
no benefits can be achieved in dealing with BMHs without exemplary punishment being
imposed on such wrongdoers.118 Awarding six months imprisonment for defaulting
repayment of Tk10 million (US$125,000)119 may rather ‘allure’ future defaulters to stay away
from paying back their loans, because of the triviality of the punishment. Given that most big
loan defaults are believed to be deliberate, such a trivial punishment is completely unfair
compared to the three years’ incarceration of a poor man who steals foods for him or for his
minor children.120 It has to be conceded that a success in fighting corruption requires
‘adopting a multi-pronged approach including introducing tougher new laws and enforcing
them.’121 For example, Hong Kong had a similar problem with black money during 19841993, and it has effectively controlled that menace mainly through strict enforcement of
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law.122 The Hong Kong corruption watchdog successfully prosecuted the corrupt and secured
conviction of about 300 of them per year from 1993 to 1997, which evidences that enduring
improvement in combating corruption entails strict enforcement of penal provisions. 123 It is
widely accepted that the risk of penalty discourages secret dealings and encourages
disclosures.124 Arlen and Kraakman argue that disclosure and nondisclosure of secret
information are dependent upon the cost-benefit calculus.125 The current conviction rates in
corruption cases in Bangladesh are not impressive as shown shortly below. Strict and
predictable enforcement are needed to create both specific and general deterrence.
Improving corruption investigations
Investigation into corruption may not always be an easy task, because the offence is
committed in private, and in most cases both parties to such a crime remain happy even after
the commission of the crime. As coined by Soltes ‘white-collar crimes usually lack videotape
or wiretap evidence depicting the crime as it occurred’.126 He further asserts that proof of
such crimes typically requires ‘to be built by the tedious and laborious accumulation of
documentation and triangulation of facts’ 127 Given that both parties are happy sometimes, it
may seem to be victimless crime, but in fact its victims are the whole nation one way or
another. The rates of acquittals and that of the case investigations are not quite impressive.
ACC’s investigation needs to be strengthened by imparting adequate training to its relevant
officers and increasing the number of such officers in order to carry out expeditious and
efficient investigation. One report finds that about 93 per cent of the complaints received by
the ACC are not investigated,128 while another report reveals that the ACC does not consider
even 0.5 per cent complains worth investigating, meaning the watchdog puts most complaints
into bins.129 Admittedly, all complaints may not be worthy of investigation, but it sounds
absurd that more than 99 per cent of the complaints are frivolous, in an environment where
67.8 per cent households are victims of corruption. 130 This situation warrants deeper
consideration as to why people like filing false complaints, and also whether all rejections by
the ACC are fair or unduly influenced by any quarter. Further, even those who are prosecuted
by the ACC, 68 per cent of them are acquitted, whereas 99.77% are relieved at the committal
hearing stage.131 Out of 662 cases lodged by the ACC between 2012 and 2015, the watchdog
lost 411 cases – showing overtly poor performance. 132 All these may imply weaknesses of
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investigators and the investigation process. It is strongly desirable that undue harassment of
anyone has to be avoided, and at the same time, true culprits should fell the full force of law.
If the scope of investigation appears to be presently narrow leading to refusal of
investigations or acquittal of accused persons, it has to be widened to bring more complaints
into the microscope of the ACC and ensure a greater success. Above all, a firm commitment
of both governments and the independence of the ACC are essential to prosecute politicians
themselves and those who are shielded by politicians in particular. 133 Otherwise, the
‘toothless or paper tiger’ the ACC, as it was called by its immediate past chairman,134 must be
destined to fail. The watchdog does have public confidence crisis,135 public trust can be
earned only through its proactive role and notable success in combating corruption. This
success requires a more intrusive legal system and enforcement techniques to deal with
corruption. 136
An influential editorial suggests, the watchdog should focus on its capacity building,
particularly in skills, efficiency and logistics, and it adds that building an effective ACC
warrants a good legal framework supported by structural and functional independence and its
operational neutrality.137 However, the government must stop the culture of impunity,
because a threat to punish by the ACC, and indemnity from that punishment before the
crooks are hooked, may not work.
Operating proactive financial intelligence agencies
Both corruption and money laundering are committed typically in secret. Hence a strong and
proactive financial intelligence agency needs to be put in place. The agency cannot succeed
alone, it has to be supported by other related agencies and financial institutions as it is
important to utilise synergy benefits and thereby to improve efficiency and enhance
integrity.138 It is to be borne in mind that a truly intrusive legal system and enforcement
technique are necessary to deal with corruption and money laundering. 139
Raising public resistance and social denounce
Paying and receiving bribes have been part of culture in Bangladesh, as both sides in many
instances consider bribery is justified in that recipients help givers regardless of the
legitimacy of the latter’s pursuits. A radical change in public attitude is sine qua non, law
alone seems insufficient to combat this peril primarily because corruption itself has crippled
the power of law for which it cannot take its own course. Hence the law is ineffective.
Millions of youths and educated people must come out to resist the corrupt practices at
workplace, and BMHs should be socially boycotted. It is not difficult to correctly identify
BMHs in our society taking into account their life style compared to their known sources of
133
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income, though the bribes givers could not be easily singled out as many people secretly
bribe officials even to obtain their legal entitlements expeditiously, and they should be
motivated to be whistle-blowers.
Using public media for mass education
The role of media in fighting corruption is widely recognised. The chairman of the ACC has
recently pronounced that their only friends are journalists. 140 Consistently, Wolfensohn spells
out:
A free press is not a luxury. A free press is at the absolute core of equitable
development because if you cannot enfranchise poor people, if they do not have a
right to expression, if there is no searchlight on corruption and inequitable practices,
you cannot build the public consensus needed to bring about change.141
Likewise, Transparency International highlighted the profound significance of free media
alongside an independent judiciary in fighting corruption. 142 It is appreciable that the press
and electronic media in Bangladesh enjoy significant freedom compared to many other
developing countries. However, their roles need to be more educational mirroring that the
society intensely denounces corruption. The media need to be investigative in digging out
corrupt practices, and be meticulous in disclosing the significance of financial crimes and
related punishments. All these can deter potential offenders, keep the society informed of the
people involved in such crimes, and stimulate social movement against these evils.
Educating students at institutions
Lack of moral education facilitated by an environment conducive to adopt unfair means has
worsened the malpractice of corruption in Bangladesh. Alongside the minimisation of
corruption friendly environment, the level of moral education in general should be raised in
order to ensure a sustainable improvement in preventing this social disease. The current
institutional curricula at any level of education do not incorporate moral teachings that may
positively influence students’ thinking and determination against corruption. Moral education
should be made compulsory at both primary and secondary levels demonstrating the
responsibility of an individual as an ordinary citizen as well as a public official. A common
compulsory subject titled ‘Bangladesh Studies’ incorporating critical facets of people’s lives
in Bangladesh including moral teachings can be introduced at the tertiary level. It must
address the socio-economic harm that may be caused by corruption to an individual, society
and the national economy. Of course, all students will not abide by that moral principles, but
some will certainly do – that some can make a difference in the long term.
Targeting both supply and demand sides
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Law should impose bar on both givers and receivers of bribes. Givers can be excused if they
act as whistle-blowers whose protection could make a significant difference in unearthing
corruption. Of course, the receivers should be punished adequately, though the mala fide
givers who bribe officials to gain something undue and subsequently remain silent should
also be penalised less rigorously. However, those who are compelled to pay bribes in
securing their legitimate claims may be excused with reprimand, and should be motivated to
lodge complaints to appropriate authorities against the corrupt officials as whistle-blowers.
As acknowledged earlier, despite huge money laundering being occurred, BMHs still control
the property market making it hard for honest taxpayers to buy their homes to live in.143 This
well-known fact is reinforced by the unexpected response of Rehab144 to the ACC’s request
for information on the property ownerships by individuals. Rehab claims that such a request
from the ACC has contributed to shrinking investment in real estate.145 It indirectly supports
the claim that black money has some influence in the real estate market. Arguably, the real
estate industry could somehow make some progress by allowing black money, but ownership
level is likely to decrease due to concentration of home ownership amongst mostly the
BMHs. We need more to increase and diversify the ownership level for social stability and
meaningful democracy than erecting numerous high rises. 146
Proffering whistle-blower protection would be critical to implementing this recommendation.
It is appreciable that Bangladesh has enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act 2011 aimed at
providing legal protection to persons who will disclose critical information relating to public
interest. The protection of whistle-blowers has been commonplace in dealing with criminal
activities worldwide.147 Law in book would not be enough, it must be applied in order to get
its benefit. Public should be made well aware of this law.
Ensuring transparency in official activities
Transparency has a hostile relation with corruption, therefore strengthening the former must
weaken the latter. Art 13 of the UNCAC, ratified by Bangladesh in 2007, imposes
responsibility on state parties that ‘each State Party shall … promote active participation of
individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental
organisations and community-based organisations, in the prevention of and the fight against
corruption …’. The government of Bangladesh in 2009 made a plan to implement the pledges
under the above Convention. With this end in view, several pieces of legislation, such as the
Right to Information Act 2009, the Whistle-blower Protection Act 2011, and the National
Integrity Strategy 2012, have been enacted. 148 Bangladesh has subscribed to the 2015 UN
Sustainable Development Goals 2030, Goal 16 of which confers obligations to the
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government: to improve accountability at all levels; to substantially reduce corruption and
bribery in all forms; significantly reduce illicit financial flows and combat all forms of
organised crimes; and to ensure public access to information and protect fundamental
freedoms.
All these are good initiatives, however, laws in paper must be translated into practice in order
to get their benefits. So enforcement of these laws can improve the accountability of state
functionaries, such as the ACC, the executive, the judiciary, the legislature, the law
enforcement agencies149 – this is what is needed most at this stage.

Introducing naming and shaming of offenders
‘Name and shame’ is a useful regulatory tool. 150 A national database of convicted offenders
of all categories (petty criminals excepted) could be created, as many other countries have
such a source of information on criminals.151 The database should include names and
addresses of all criminals, the crimes committed by them and the penalties awarded to them.
For corporations which are involved in criminal activities, their information should also be
made public in the same way as individual, and in addition, companies could be compelled to
publicise their convictions by court orders as introduced in Australia.152 This is expected to
create considerable specific and general deterrence, which may contribute to lessening
commission of the crimes at hand.
Increasing housing affordability for honest taxpayers
Amnesty to BMHs is sought to increase housing price and facilitate home ownership by
perceived ‘criminals’ only. This is so because honest earners can hardly beat the dishonest in
terms of bid prices. As a result, BMHs will buy one house after another, and honest taxpayers
will rent those houses to live in by paying their hard-earned ‘originally’ white money to those
BMHs. What a serious injustice this is from social, moral and legal points of view!153 This
issue can be effectively addressed in a fair and honest way. First, state owned banks must
stop giving ‘bad’ loans in order to avoid ever increasing defaults. Evidence, as cited above,
suggests that dishonest bank officers in conjunction with amoral politicians knowingly and
deliberately approve loans to those mala fide ineligible borrowers who will not be able to
repay their debts. A question begs to be answered, why state owned banks have been
suffering financial crisis and capital losses, whereas private banks at the same time are
making huge profits.154 Secondly, interest rates on home loans should be reasonably reduced
in comparison with other countries. The demand side could then be stronger than what BMHs
149
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could do. The reduced interest rate would be affordable to lenders if the present
disproportionate loan defaults could be minimised. Thirdly, the disposal of financial cases
should be expedited and punishment should be increased giving a strong signal to potential
mala fide borrowers that borrowed money shall have to be returned or they will have to face
legal sanctions. In practice, many defaulters are sued, cases are not disposed of, and
paradoxically they manage to get further loans using undue influence. 155 Alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) can be introduced, and wilful defaulters must be adequately punished
instead of rewarding through rescheduling their loans or awarding new loans. 156 Fourthly,
sometimes, bank officials get indulged in financial crimes owing to lack of training and
adequate knowledge.157 In such cases, officers need to be properly trained. 158Fifthly, a
national list of insolvency needs to be created, and be made public through a database. Also,
a national list of personal property securities should be introduced and maintained so that the
same asset cannot be further used as security without the knowledge of the previous and new
lenders. Such a list is maintained in Australia under the Personal Property Securities Act
2009 (Cth). Sixthly, the recapitalisation of banks after making capital loss by taxpayers’
money should be stopped, and banks themselves must recover their losses.159
Adopting voluntary self-governance code
Crimes are essentially deviation from certain standards of human behaviours. 160 Financial
institutions are directly involved in corruption and money laundering. All businesses must
have an ethical code of self-governance, and they should voluntary yet strictly adhere to that
code. For example, banks in Australia have a Code of Banking Practice developed by the
Australian Bankers’ Association setting out standards of good banking practice. Johnson
emphasised that ‘corruption should be fought with a combination of legal and ethical tools,
including (a) prohibitions of clearly improper conduct, (b) disclosure requirements that
expose questionable practices to public scrutiny, and (c) clear statements of aspirational
principles.’161 To successfully combat corruption, all these - prohibitions, disclosure
requirements, or aspirational principles – should be used simultaneously.162 He asserts ethics
code, adequate training on ethical conduct, and useful mechanisms are critical to fighting
corruption.163 So, adopting a well-articulated code of ethics by individual business
organisations and another code by the respective industry can contribute to lessening
financial crimes. The governance weakness in the banking sector is obvious, as the Centre for
Policy Dialogue (CPD), a think tank, observes that the banking sector has been a ‘growing
malignancy’ for the economy of Bangladesh owing to rising loan defaults and lack of good
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governance.164 So the banking governance weaknesses should be addressed before it becomes
too late.

Conclusions
A 1975 speech of the father of the nation and the first president of Bangladesh is worth
quoting when he called upon the people: ‘… the number one priority is to root out
corruption … I need your help … I will enforce the law, I will not spare anybody … it has to
be a people’s movement … It has to be a movement to socially boycott the bribe-taker and
the corrupt. … who can do it? Students can do it, the youth can, intellectuals can, the people
can, each house should be turned into a fortress against corruption’.165 What a prophetic call
he made decades ago. His party is now in government headed by his daughter who is also
sincere about eliminating corruption, however, her commitment alone may not be sufficient
to root out this evil. Before the situation deteriorates further, both the people and government
need to realise that unrestrained corruption ‘cripples institutional trust and public confidence
in the political system’.166 It does ruins the prospect of economic progress and social
development of a nation.167 This article argues corruption is the dominant source of black
money and money laundering. While all of these three should be addressed simultaneously,
top priority needs to be given to preventing corruption. The ACC’s recommendation to offer
further whitening opportunity to BMHs seems to be flawed, ill-thought-out and
misjudgement of the futility of the amnesties offered thus far. The government and state
machineries alone might not be sufficient to root out the vicious practices of mostly
financially and/or politically influential people, active protest of the society is essential.
Crystallising social protests entails public awareness and moral education. This article
demonstrates the causes and effects of the black money legalising opportunity showing that
such amnesties have effectually contributed to increasing corruption and money laundering. It
gives emphasis to the prevention of these crimes, submits specific recommendations aimed at
strengthening legal regulation and enhancing social denounce. Recommendations include: (i)
strengthening enforcement of existing laws; (ii) improving corruption investigations; (iii)
operating proactive financial intelligence agencies; (iv) raising public resistance and social
denounce; (v) using public media for mass education; (vi) educating students at institutions;
(vii) targeting both supply and demand sides; (viii) ensuring transparency in official
activities; (ix) introducing naming and shaming of offenders; (x) increasing housing
affordability for honest taxpayers; and (xi) adopting voluntary self-governance code. It is
reasonably believed that the implementation of these recommendations will discourage
people to engage in the commission of the offences in question, and thereby contribute to
achieving the national socio-economic development. We have to admit that passivity does
not bring about any changes which require concerned authorities to be proactive, as we
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‘cannot beat something with nothing’.168 So the graft watchdog must bark to keep predators
away.
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